Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism:
Berle’s Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of
Countervailing Power
John W. Cioffi†
I. INTRODUCTION: BERLE AS ADOPTED FOREFATHER OF SHAREHOLDER
PRIMACY AND QUASI-CORPORATIST
Pathbreaking and influential intellectual works are often reinterpreted and appropriated in support of propositions and policy positions
inconsistent or directly at odds with their authors’ views. Adolf Berle’s
seminal critiques of managerial power and analysis of the separation of
ownership and control provide an especially important and illuminating
case in point.1 Berle’s work, both his celebrated collaboration with Gardiner Means and his individual writings, helped lay the modern intellectual foundations for shareholder capitalism and shareholder-centric theories of corporate governance, the normative ideal of shareholder primacy,
and the ideology of shareholder value espoused by later law and economics scholars, lawyers and jurists, policymakers, and managers themselves.2 Scholars in law, economics, business, and political science have
† Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside. Ph.D., University of
California, Berkeley (2001); J.D., Rutgers School of Law, Newark (1990). Prepared for the Second
Annual Symposium, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society, Seattle University
Law School, January 21–22, 2011. I would like to thank the participants in the Berle Center’s
Second Annual Symposium for comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I am especially indebted
to Charles O’Kelley for organizing the Symposium and to Bill Bratton and Fenner Stewart, whose
comments, conversation, and earlier papers on the evolution and historical context of Adolf Berle’s
thinking were particularly helpful in the development of my own thinking. Responsibility for any
errors, omissions, or lapses in judgment remain my own.
1. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW
DEVELOPMENT IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959) [hereinafter BERLE, POWER
WITHOUT PROPERTY]; ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1928);
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1962).
2. This reinterpretation of the central problem posed by Berle and Means as a principal–agent
problem of managerial incentives and the costs to economic efficiency, rather than a political and
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all adopted and refined the operationalization of Berle’s stylized conception of dispersed shareholding as a proxy metric, and even a policy goal
or teleological ideal, for the relative maturation and economic efficiency
of national financial systems, corporate organizations, and legal systems.
The neoliberal appropriation of Berle’s incisive critiques of corporate and managerial power and their reinterpretation through the lens of
neoclassical economics have inverted his original intentions, and the political and economic concerns underlying these original intentions are
now more pertinent than at any time since they were originally written.3
A great critic of the prevailing form of finance capitalism of his day has
been appropriated to justify the ascendance of the new form of finance
capitalism of our own. The influential architect of the New Deal and the
American administrative and regulatory state has been domesticated
within the confines of contemporary neoliberalism and neoclassical economics to serve as a posthumous champion of limiting state power over
the governance of the corporation. The deep structural flaws that Berle
found in the American public corporation have given way to a preoccupation with promoting the diffusion of shareholding as a policy goal and
indicator of efficient, well-developed capital markets.

social problem of power and control created by the large public corporation, began shortly after the
book was published in 1932, though it initially tended to take the form of a defense of managerialism. See NORMAN S. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 446–48 (1940);
Robert A. Gordon, Financial Control of Large-Scale Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 85 supp.
(1939); Robert A. Gordon, Ownership and Compensation as Incentives to Corporation Executives,
54 Q. J. ECON. 455 (1940). Appropriation of Berle and Means as support for the agency theories of
the emerging neoclassical law and economics began in earnest by the 1960s. See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 46, 67 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959); Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism”
of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (1962); see also ALLEN KAUFMAN, LAWRENCE
ZACHARIAS & MARVIN KARSON, MANAGERS VS. OWNERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1995) (tracing the development of the agency and shareholder primacy position). By the 1980s, Berle and Means’s analysis of the separation of ownership from
control was foundational in theoretical justifications of shareholder primacy. See, e.g., Eugene F.
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 289 (1980); Eugene F.
Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 308 (1983);
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976); cf. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The
Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 240 (1983) (criticizing
Berle and Means for failing to focus systematically on managerial incentives and agency costs within the firm).
3. Likewise, an earlier generation of scholars invoked Berle and Means’s analysis of managerial power as supporting their contentions that the postwar American political economy had resolved
the problem of concentrated power in industrial capitalism by means of the separation of ownership
and control—precisely reversing the argument of the book. See Mark S. Mizruchi & Daniel Hirschman, The Modern Corporation as Social Construction, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1065, 1074–79
(2010).
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To be fair, Berle’s attachment to the trust theory of the corporate
firm and emphasis on fiduciary duties as his favored legal mechanism for
shareholder protection provided intellectual ammunition for later advocates of shareholder primacy as a legal norm and policy goal. Likewise,
the separation of ownership and control was, and is, well-suited to serve
as the template for the analysis of principal–agent problems and agency
costs, which are the central problems of corporate governance and securities regulation. Berle’s empirical and theoretical work did champion
the shareholder cause, but it did so for ends far broader and deeper than
mere enhancements of shareholder returns or even economic efficiency.
Like many of his contemporaries, Berle’s fundamental preoccupations were not economic efficiency, corporate profitability, or even corporate governance, but rather the allocation and accountability of private
power and its legitimation by forms of economic governance that constrained and enabled private interests to serve the public interest.4 The
shareholder and the corporate entity were embedded in a set of broader
societal, legal, and political relationships and arrangements threatened by
the immense power unleashed by industrialization. Ultimately, in Berle’s
own thinking and in post-New Deal practice, the emergence and development of the administrative state loomed larger and played a more important role than the legal principles and structures of corporate governance. Future generations are free to refashion and use theories and analytical frameworks in new ways to address new problems, at least when
their content and implications are not misstated. But the double irony in
Berle’s case is that the problems of governance, power, and accountability that so engaged him never disappeared. In fact, the rise of contemporary finance capitalism, legitimated in part by theories of shareholder
primacy he helped to inspire, has revived these problems to an astonishing degree.
Berle’s prominent intellectual and political role as an important inspiration and architect of the New Deal policy agenda and its legal infrastructure, and later as a prominent defender of the post-New Deal political economic order, further contribute to the ambiguity of his legacy.
Berle and Means’s foundational text on the modern large corporation,
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (The Modern Corporation), was hailed as the “Economic Bible” of the New Deal,5 and that
transformative period of American history has generated fierce controversy over its essential character as an approach to economic governance
4. Cf. id. (arguing that the concentration of power fostered by the separation of ownership and
control was a central concern of Berle and Means).
5. PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL
THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 237 (2008) (quoting Time magazine, April 24, 1933).
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and the merits of its contributions to the establishment of the modern
American state. Berle was a member of the Roosevelt “brain trust” and
one of the most influential architects and defenders of the New Deal
from its earliest—and most explicitly corporatist—incarnation.6 He was a
forceful proponent of the early New Deal’s ultimately ill-fated experiment in corporatism, the National Industrial Recovery Administration
(NIRA), leading many commentators to identify Berle’s thinking as fundamentally and enduringly corporatist. Consequently, Berle has been
characterized as advocating, or at least accepting, the displacement of the
individualistic and competitive market by large, hierarchical, and technocratically managed organizations.7 Yet Berle did not play a significant
role in the NIRA’s design, played no role in its administration, and was
critical of its operation in practice.8 His thinking following the failure of
the NIRA and National Recovery Administration (NRA) tended to endorse, though with considerable ambivalence, the emergence of a robust
regulatory state, which would prove to be the most durable legacy of the
New Deal and would largely define the paradigm of post-New Deal economic and corporate governance.9
This Article engages these problematic interpretations, as well as
their implications for understanding Berle’s legacy and its relevance to
some of the most critically important contemporary dilemmas of American law, policy, and politics. Yet his great contributions to the theory and
empirical analysis of corporate governance, corporate finance, and the
dangers of unaccountable managerial power just as surely—and far more
enduringly—informed the development of securities regulation during
the New Deal and postwar eras, as well as its emphasis on strengthening
shareholder rights, protecting investor interests, and promoting the development of financial markets. Berle’s work and legacy are as riddled
6. See DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 74–79 (1988); JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A.
BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 75–79, 83–85 (1987).
7. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 115 (2008); Roberta Romano,
Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 936 (1984); see also SCHWARZ,
supra note 6, at 83–85 (identifying Berle as one of the leading proponents of economic “planning,”
“collectivism,” and an American version of state capitalism, but not describing his vision of the New
Deal as corporatist). Bratton and Wachter are careful to qualify their identification of Berle as a
corporatist, and readily concede that the New Deal and the postwar political economy erected on its
legal and institutional foundations was ultimately not a form of corporatism. But the concession
highlights the problematic nature of the characterization and terminological usage.
8. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 7; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking
Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
849, 855–56; SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 88.
9. Cf. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 7, at 136 (“[T]he NIRA had failed, but a regulatory state
had evolved to replace it.”).
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with internal tensions and contradictions as the American legal and political economic regimes that he so deeply influenced.
Characterizing the New Deal, let alone the political economic and
regulatory regime that emerged as its lasting legacy, as corporatist is imprecise, prone to misunderstanding, and largely erroneous. The misuse of
corporatism as a term not only misconceives neocorporatism as a theory
of governance and political economic ordering, but also obscures its core
institutional and juridical attributes along with the variety of its historical
and existing forms across much of the industrialized world. Still worse,
the increasingly common description of contemporary economic and
regulatory policy as corporatist is polemical, rather than analytical.10 The
imprecise use of the term corporatist does not merely distort our understanding of Berle and his times, it also, and more importantly, distracts
our attention from the salient, enduring features of the American political
economy and a regulatory and administrative state that appears increasingly inadequate for addressing the causes and consequences of our recent catastrophic financial crisis. The use of the term corporatist to characterize the destructive deregulatory policies and regulatory failures that
contributed to the financialization of the economy, the excessive power
of the financial sector, and ultimately, the global financial crisis and
Great Recession is perverse.11 These policies and the catastrophic crises
they unleashed reflected the growing hegemony of neoliberal ideology
empowered by financial and other business elites pursuing “free market”
policy agendas. Likewise, characterizing as corporatist the federal government’s controversial and, in many respects, deeply flawed and unpo10. Cf. Robert Teitelbaum, An Excursion with Adolf Berle, DEAL (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://www.thedeal.com/thedealeconomy/an-excursion-with-adolph-berle.php (Corporatism has a
“close ‘association’ with the fascist politics of the ’20s and ’30s in Europe, much as collectivism is
redolent of the Soviet Union. . . . Like ‘bureaucracy,’ ‘corporatism’ has a clearly negative edge.”).
11. Nouriel Roubini, the eminent and influential economist, has described pro-finance policies
and legal changes as both corporatist and as the product of extremist neoliberal ideology, revealing
the depths of the conceptual and terminological confusion in contemporary policy debates and discourse. See Nouriel Roubini, The Transformation of the USA into the USSRA (United Socialist State
Republic of America) Continues at Full Speed with the Nationalization of AIG, RGE
ECONOMONITOR (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.roubini.com/roubini-monitor/253625/. But cf. Martin
Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.1
(1987) (“[T]he term ‘corporatism’ refers to the interaction between a corporation and its various
constituencies.”). But Lipton’s conception of “finance corporatism” does relate to neocorporatism as
a political–economic regime in two important ways. First, he elaborates on his definition of corporatism to refer “not only to the development of capital-gathering arrangements, but also to the broader
evolution of a corporation’s relationships with its constituencies, such as shareholders, employees,
and creditors, which are the proper subjects of any corporate governance debate.” Second, he is
concerned with the legal rules, and thus the deployment of political power, to define the power relations within corporate governance. The political and juridical ordering of these stakeholder relations
is a core function of neocorporatist institutional arrangements, whether at the level of firm or macroeconomic governance. See id.
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pular responses to the recent crisis, including bailouts of various financial institutions and the Dodd-Frank Act’s reform of banking and financial regulation, is an especially problematic and emblematic instance of
this obfuscating polemical turn.12 These policies and legal reforms bear
no discernible relation to neocorporatism as an ideal type of regime or to
the formal or substantive role of law within neocorporatist institutional
arrangements and governance processes. The use of corporatist as a term
for plutocratic politics, state and regulatory capture, and wholesale corruption of policymaking serves to foreclose paths of reform toward alternative forms of regulation and governance that are potentially capable of
redressing the increasingly serious problems of instability, inequality,
and illegitimacy generated by contemporary neoliberal finance capitalism.13
Berle’s thinking was not informed by corporatist theories, nor was
it an adaptation of corporatist-type principles of institutional design and
governance to the level of the corporation.14 Further, his advocacy of
national economic planning through quasi-corporatist arrangements during the early New Deal reflected a contradictory and often vague conception of how such arrangements should be structured and function with
respect to the role of the state, business interests, and formal rules. The
ambiguities of Berle’s intellectual legacy can be clarified by viewing it in
the context of the rise and fall of “countervailing power” in the American
political economy. John Kenneth Galbraith identified countervailing
12. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 11–12, 77–85, 156–58 (2011) (calling the Dodd-Frank
Act a corporatist collaboration between government and large businesses that advantages and entrenches these favored corporate interests while allowing the state to channel policy through large
financial institutions); Glenn Greenwald, The Underlying Divisions in the Healthcare Debate,
SALON (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2009/12/18/
corporatism/index.html (stating that the Democratic Party and the Clinton and Obama Administrations have a “corporatism” that, “[a]t its core, . . . seeks to use government power not to regulate, but
to benefit and even merge with, large corporate interests, both for political power . . . and for policy
ends . . . devoted to empowering large corporations”); Evan McMorris-Santoro, Ron Paul: President
Obama is Not a Socialist, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 10, 2010), http://tpmdc.talkingpoints
memo.com/2010/04/ron-paul-president-obama-is-not-a-socialst.php (discussing Ron Paul’s denunciation of President Obama, much of the Republican Party, and broad areas of federal policy as
corporatist); Roubini, supra note 11 (financial sector bailouts are “akin to the creation of a corporatist state (like the Italian fascism or the German[] Third Reich) where private sector interest[s] are
protected (gains privatized and losses socialized) where the government is taken over by corrupt and
reckless private interests”).
13. In this sense, the tendentious ideological and discursive distortion of the terms “corporatism” and “corporatist” recapitulates the earlier misuse and debasement of the terms “liberal” and
“socialist” in post-New Deal and post-Cold War American political discourse.
14. But cf. JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REFORM IN THE AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 68, 73–75, 81 (2010) (discussing the replication of
neocorporatist legal mechanisms at the firm level to create a form of “microcorporatist” corporate
governance in Germany).
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power in 1952 as a pervasive structural feature of the postwar economic
order that served as a crucial means of stabilization and legitimation.
This concept referred to the largely spontaneous and market-driven
emergence of increasingly organized opposing interests within the economy that were capable of bargaining with each other on roughly equal
terms. The consequent balance of economic power effected by these
countervailing organizational interests ameliorated threats to both the
economic and political order posed by the massive concentration of unconstrained managerial power made possible by industrialization and the
rise of the large publicly held corporation. Within the postwar economic
regime of countervailing power, corporate management was situated
within a comprehensive set of market relationships that limited managerial discretion and promoted the development of a form of corporate
and sectoral organization, as well as an accompanying management
style, that tamed the self-serving excesses of managerial and financial
elites.
In Part II, this Article provides a general overview of the distinctive
institutional, functional, and juridical characteristics of neocorporatist
forms of governance. Part III briefly examines some of the ambiguities
and tensions within Berle’s thinking about the governance of the publicly
traded corporation and the role of the state, law, and regulation in the
broader political economy before and during the New Deal era. Part IV
reviews Galbraith’s theory of countervailing power to highlight the distinctive and, in many ways, exceptional characteristics of the liberal
postwar political economic order in the United States that differentiate it
from the neocorporatist forms of organization and governance prevalent
in much of the world during the postwar era. Part V then discusses the
economic crisis of the 1970s and the takeover wave of the 1980s as pivotal in the collapse of countervailing power and the emergence of a new
form of neoliberal finance capital. The Article concludes by showing
how this political economic order has developed and imploded in ways
that recapitulate many of Berle’s political and economic critiques of corporate power, unregulated markets, and the role of the state and law in
ameliorating the excesses and crises of capitalism.
II. LEVELS OF NEOCORPORATIST GOVERNANCE AND
THEIR LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
The imprecise use of the term corporatism tends to equate it, quite
incorrectly, with the deeply flawed economic policies implicated in the
hypertrophic growth, collapse, and public bailouts of the financial sector
in the United States and other neoliberal (i.e., non-corporatist) national
economies. Likewise, this idiosyncratic turn in American political dis-
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course and, to some extent, scholarly commentary collapses the “state
corporatism” of the pre-World War II period (with its dark associations
with fascism and authoritarianism) with the democratic neocorporatism
of postwar European social democracy and Christian democracy.15 This
tends to preclude serious consideration of policy ideas and institutional
designs derived from neocorporatist theory and practices that might
prove instructive and useful in grappling with the deep-seated structural
deficiencies and policy problems afflicting the American political, legal,
and economic systems.
Whereas “pluralism suggests spontaneous formation, numerical
proliferation, horizontal extension, and competitive interaction,” neocorporatism entails “controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical
stratification, and complementary interdependence.”16 Philippe Schmitter
offered a classic, succinct, and structurally oriented definition of corporatism:
[Corporatism is] a system of interest representation in which the
constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular,
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created)
by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands
and supports.17

In contradistinction, pluralism can be defined as the inverse of corporatism. Conceptualized in formal, legal terms:
[Pluralism is] a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple,
voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered, and self determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and
which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories.18

15. Much of the scholarly literature refers to the non-authoritarian corporatism of the postwar
era as neocorporatism. I follow that convention here.
16. GUY MUNDLAK, FADING CORPORATISM: ISRAEL’S LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 17 (ILR Press, Cornell Univ. Press 2007) (citing Philippe Schmitter,
Corporatism is Dead! Long Live Corporatism!, 24 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 54, 62 (1989); Philippe
Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV. POL. 85 (1974)[hereinafter Schmitter, Still the
Century of Corporatism?]).
17. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, supra note 16, at 93–94.
18. Id.
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Within a neocorporatist system of governance, actors and organizations are classified within functional or interest categories and then institutionalized as some form of associational organization in order to carry
out functions pertaining to representation and negotiation. The classic
form and function of this type of democratic corporatist governance,
commonly identified with Scandinavian political–economic models, is
national trilateral concertation of collective bargaining over wages and
other labor relations issues among authoritative centralized unions, employers associations, and state representatives at the national or sectoral
(or “meso-corporatist”) level. Corporatist institutions also generally play
an authoritative policymaking (or implementation) function through legal
delegations of rulemaking and governance responsibilities to private associational organizations that act as “private interest governments” that
enable “the public use of private organized interests.”19
With the widespread erosion or disintegration of national and sectoral corporatist “concertation,” the quasi-regulatory and governance
functions of corporatist institutional arrangements have taken on greater
prominence and importance in enabling and enhancing economic and
policy coordination among and within sectors, interest groups, and firms.
Indeed, during the past half-century, juridical and institutional legacies of
corporatism have informed the development of legal architectures and
institutional forms of “microcorporatism” at the level of the corporate
firm in Western Europe (and arguably Japan).20 The incorporation of labor interests and institutionalized channels of employee consultation,
voice, and negotiation within processes of firm decision-making translate
the representational logic and legal mechanisms of corporatism into the
juridical forms and practices of corporate governance. Institutional organization and representation of employees within the firm, whether
19. Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter, Community, Market, State—and Associations?
The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to the Social Order, in PRIVATE INTEREST
GOVERNMENT: BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 1 (Philippe C. Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck eds.,
1985). For a useful summary of the ideal typic formal features of corporatism, see MUNDLAK, supra
note 16, at 15–23.
20. But the presence of firm-level microcorporatist mechanisms and practices has been found
to be correlated with preexisting macro-level (i.e., national and sectoral) neocorporatist arrangements. See Alexander Hicks & Lane Kenworthy, Cooperation and Political Economic Performance
in Affluent Democratic Capitalism, 103 AM. J. SOC. 631 (1998). For theoretical and empirical treatments of microcorporatism, see Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Microcorporatist Structures in German Law
on Groups of Companies, in REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE 317 (David Sugarman &
Gunther Teubner eds., 1990) [hereinafter REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS]; Wolfgang Streeck,
Status and Contract as Basic Categories of a Sociological Theory of Industrial Relations, in
REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS, supra, at 105; Gunther Teubner, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate
Governance in Group Enterprises, in REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS, supra, at 67, 78–82;
Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the ‘Essence’ of the Legal
Person, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 130 (1988).
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through employee committees, works councils, or board representation,
are prevalent in European countries and increasingly adopted into the law
of the European Union.
Law plays a critical role in constituting and buttressing the institutional forms and functions of neocorporatism. Even where the state does
not play a dominant, or any, active role in coordination or “concertation,”
it does play an essential function in creating the legal foundations for the
formation, activities, and perpetuation of neocorporatist associations. The
state, through law and regulation, fashions the basic juridical and institutional structures that supplant contractual and market relations as mechanisms designed to contain and intermediate relations and conflicts
among interest groups. Frameworks of legal rules either mandate or incentivize the participation in neocorporatist or microcorporatist arrangements by firms, associational organizations, interest groups, and individuals. The constitutive function of law enables the necessary attributes of
organizational exclusivity, centralization, and concentration of representational and bargaining authority in neocorporatist associations and microcorporatist firms.21 Simultaneously, the legal foundations of neocorporatist arrangements and bargaining practices perform an essential legitimation function that renders them more acceptable within a democratic
polity under the rule of law. As Guy Mundlak notes, “The unique feature
of associations in corporatism is their exclusive, quasi-legal position.
Exclusivity is a result of the singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered nature of these associations. The quasi-legal position granted to
these associations is what makes exclusivity possible within the domains
of the rule of law.”22
This, of course, does not assure the popular legitimacy or passive
acceptance of neocorporatist arrangements. The state and the law obviously cannot fulfill legitimation functions where political, and therefore legal, legitimacy is lacking. Politics and law cannot confer legitimacy they do not possess themselves. Causation can flow in the opposite
direction, as well. The broader legitimacy of the state and public law may
be compromised where, due to conflicts with widely held social values or
serious institutional dysfunction, the legitimacy of corporatist arrangements is largely absent (e.g., the quasi-corporatist elements of the early
New Deal) or has decayed (e.g., neocorporatist countries suffering pro21. For example, legislation that extends the terms of collective bargaining agreements or
product standards on all firms within a given sector profoundly alters incentives to participate in
corporatist associations and negotiations by foreclosing the easy-exit options available in a more
voluntarist pluralist system. See MUNDLAK, supra note 16, at 15–27 (providing an analytical account
of the quasi-legal character of neocorporatist institutions and contrasting their characteristic exclusivity, centralization, and concentration of authority with pluralist politics and governance).
22. Id. at 17–18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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longed slow growth, rising structural unemployment, and increasing inequality).
The foregoing discussion indicates how the form and functions of
law in neocorporatist systems are distinct from the role of law in more
market-driven pluralist systems, where law plays a prominent and essential role in constituting institutional arrangements and allocating power
within them. The institutionalization and practices of neocorporatism at
the levels of the national economy, economic sector, and firm thus rely
on law’s constitutive role as a source of institutional architecture and delegated authority. This contrasts sharply with the primacy of marketenabling and contractual functions of law in liberal market economies, as
fostered by pluralist political systems and promoted by neoliberal conceptions of law and economics.23 Neocorporatist law does not merely
bridge the public–private divide, it also deliberately blurs, and in some
respects effectively obviates, the dichotomous distinction between the
public and private spheres that is central to the liberal tradition of law
and political pluralism. And it does so as part of an established and entrenched political tradition that uses law and institutional arrangements to
constitute, articulate, and balance power relations among social and economic interests.
This corporatist political tradition and legal function is almost entirely foreign, literally and figuratively, to the United States. The United
States, by virtually any definition or measure of governance institutions,
legal mechanisms, or practices, has never been a corporatist political
economy.24 As discussed below, the country’s brief experimentation with
23. See CIOFFI, supra note 14, at 43–47 (distinguishing between the market-enabling function
of law in liberal market economies and the institutionalizing function that typifies neocorporatist
political economies).
24. Robert H. Salisbury, Why No Corporatism in America?, in TRENDS TOWARD
CORPORATIST INTERMEDIATION 213–30 (Gerhard Lehmbruch & Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1979);
Mancur Olson, A Theory of the Incentives Facing Political Organizations: Neocorporatism and the
Hegemonic State, 7 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 165, 178 (1986); cf. Martin Höpner, Coordination and
Organization: The Two Dimensions of Nonliberal Capitalism 12–17 (Max Planck Instit. for the
Study of Societies, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/12, 2007); Peter A. Hall & Daniel W. Gingerich,
Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical
Analysis (Max Planck Instit. for the Study of Societies, MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/05, 2004) (multiple measures of corporatism and economic coordination show, inter alia, that the United States
consistently scores the lowest on each scale of all industrialized democracies). For an argument that
a nascent form of microcorporatism emerged in the United States following the economic stagnation
and deindustrialization of the 1970s and 1980s, see Seth Borgos, Industrial Policy in a Federalist
Polity: Microcorporatism in the United States, in MANAGING MODERN CAPITALISM: INDUSTRIAL
RENEWAL AND WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE ch. 4, 65–
94 (M. Donald Hancock, John Logue & Bernt Schiller eds., 1991). As Borgos notes, however, what
he describes as microcorporatism in the American context bears no relationship to the patterns of
institutional development and governance practices in neocorporatist national economies. Instead, he
uses the term to refer to weak and poorly institutionalized collaborations among state (not federal)
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corporatist economic reforms barely lasted two years before it was struck
down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, never to be revived in
whole or in part.25 Even prior to this judicial coup de grâce, the practical
ineffectiveness and collapse of political support for the NIRA and NRA
heralded the end of corporatism as a viable and enduring approach to
economic organization and governance in the United States. No recent
developments in American politics, law, or economic organization have
borne any meaningful relation to corporatism in any of its cognizable
forms.
Post-New Deal American politics, policy, and law are simply unintelligible as a manifestation of neocorporatist law and politics. Many of
the most important and transformative conflicts over the evolving character of the American political economy during the past three decades,
beginning with the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s, have pitted the
rising power and influence of financial interests against the wellentrenched form of managerialist corporate governance that emerged
during the post-New Deal and post-World War II eras. An analysis of the
complex causes of this shift in power relations among sectors and elite
interest groups is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be noted,
however, that in contrast to the relative resiliency of the political and
economic status of labor in neocorporatist political economies, the rise of
finance in the United States accompanied and helped accelerate the longterm collapse of organized labor in the private sector. Since the 1980s,
the increasing dominance of finance and the consequent financialization
of the American economy has produced recurring and intensifying financial crises and corporate scandals that have spurred repeated legal and
regulatory reforms. Yet even in the wake of the catastrophic global financial crisis of 2007–2009, interest-group politics in the United States
has in no appreciable way displaced or even deviated from its established
pluralist form. Likewise, changes in law and policy driven by political
government, corporate management, and labor that serve to accelerate market-driven innovation and
adjustment. Id. at 79–81. These arrangements and polices failed to endure because they accepted the
increasing predominance of financial interests inimical to any form of neocorporatist interest
intermediation and coordination, and represented a continuation of the postwar market-centered
growth model that was already undermined politically by prolonged economic stagnation and
industrial deterioration.
25. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). I do not address
the extraordinary expansion and pervasiveness of economic control and planning exercised by the
federal government during the Second World War. Though worthy of additional consideration, the
radical disjuncture represented by wartime economic governance was far more statist than corporatist and, like the forms of interventionist federal policies during the First World War, was rapidly
eliminated with the cessation of hostilities (in contrast to Western Europe and Japan, where corporatist forms of governance were retained, modified, and newly fashioned to establish political legitimacy and advance reconstruction in the postwar era).
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and economic struggles between financial and managerial interests have
not significantly departed from the liberal legal tradition, as modified by
the enduring regulatory legacy of the New Deal. If anything, political
pluralism and the non-corporatist legalism of post-New Deal regulation
made the American regulatory state more vulnerable to erosion and to
influence and capture by powerful interest groups, thus making the regulatory state more liberal.
These political processes and their economic consequences would
have been familiar to Berle and other New Deal-era reformers who criticized the politics, legal foundations, and concentrated financial and economic powers of the first Gilded Age. Accordingly, Berle’s incisive and
influential analyses of the political economy of finance and corporate
capitalism of the early twentieth century are well worth revisiting as we
consider the self-destructive form taken by neoliberal finance capitalism
at the century’s end. And the ambiguities and ambivalence of Berle’s
critiques and policy positions are as instructive in understanding the dilemmas of our own age as they are for the problems of eighty years ago.
III. THE AMBIGUITIES OF THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL AND AMERICAN MANAGERIALISM
The appropriation of the separation of ownership and control for the
neoliberal ends of elevating the interests of financial capital in public
policy and enshrining the norm of shareholder primacy rests on a fundamental misunderstanding, or disregard, of historical context and, more
specifically, the constraints Berle confronted as a lawyer, legal scholar,
and politically active reformer during the pre-New Deal era. First, legal
analysis, even when deployed in deliberately pathbreaking ways, tends to
be highly constrained by the contours and contents of received legal materials that define the established and authoritative categories, norms,
procedural and institutional mechanisms, and range of cognizable legal
argument. Plausible modifications and extensions of existing legal rules,
principles, and mechanisms—such as fiduciary duties, legal hermeneutics of corporate charters, or boards of directors—are often (and still may
be) inadequate for creating fundamental reform and innovation in policy
and governance. Second, prior to the New Deal (and even afterward), the
entrenched status quo of American politics (and constitutional law) imposed narrow constraints on the possibilities for economic and regulatory
reform. Berle’s early analyses of and proposed remedies for structural
flaws in corporate governance, such as the positions espoused in The
Modern Corporation, reflected an intersection of what was legally plausible and politically possible at the time.
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Notably, Berle himself did not think of The Modern Corporation as
particularly novel. The articulation of the trust model of the corporation,
and thus the elevation of shareholder rights and regulatory protection,
tracks the functional and substantive core of corporate law. That core
was well-entrenched by the 1920s and persisted through the New Deal
and the zenith of the technocratic managerial postwar political economic
order. Berle appeared to endorse an embryonic form of shareholder primacy over a stakeholder or public interest theory of managerial responsibilities in his earlier legendary debate with Merrick Dodd about the identity and scope of the interests that should inform managerial decisionmaking. Fiduciary duties, for which the trust theory of the corporation
supplied a supportive foundation, developed within the body of American corporation law as a means of protecting shareholders by imposing
flexible and adaptable constraints on managers. Expansion of these duties to protect a wider array of stakeholders or to encompass more general, and woefully indeterminate, public interests or social values risked
diluting their function as managerial constraints and turning fiduciary
law into a means of rationalizing nearly limitless managerial discretion.
In this sense, Berle displayed an acute and early awareness of the “too
many masters” problem in fiduciary law, even if the commitment to
shareholder primacy this implied was more apparent than real. This position, largely recapitulated in The Modern Corporation, used extant legal
materials of corporation law, and most importantly the established principles of fiduciary obligations, while implicitly recognizing the limited
functions for which they were suitable.26
Berle thus saw the limitations of traditional legal categories and
principles as mechanisms to use in achieving the broader political economic reforms necessary to render managerial power democratically accountable and to promote the public good. Accordingly, at the time of the
Berle–Dodd debate, and even more so during the writing and publication
of The Modern Corporation, Berle’s professional role and disciplinary
identity as a lawyer collided with his political and policy agendas. The
institutional and disciplinary confines of law and the harsh practical
realities of politics and economics simultaneously constrained and drove
his analyses of corporate power and his prescriptions to alleviate its pathologies. Berle himself noted that the political and economic crises triggered by the Great Depression created the exceptional conditions that
made the New Deal’s legal reforms and transformation of public–private
26. One should also keep in mind that, given the inability or unwillingness of the courts to
develop and strengthen fiduciary duties to effectively constrain the managers of large corporations,
Berle’s call to adapt fiduciary law to address the new problems of managerial power and control in
the age of the large industrial corporation was not a trivial or minimalist position.
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relations possible.27 The extraordinary exigencies and rapidly unfolding
possibilities of reform enabled the creation of the modern administrative
and regulatory state. That state was able to wield powers and develop
legal and institutional forms of economic governance that had been politically—and certainly judicially—implausible in American politics prior
to the New Deal.
The Modern Corporation owed an intellectual and methodological
debt to legal realism in the empirical analysis underlying its theoretical
and policy-based arguments. While the nod to realism in much of its argumentation represented a clear departure from the prevailing orthodoxy
of legal formalism, its legal prescriptions were fairly conventional adaptations of established legal concepts, forms, and norms. Yet within
Berle’s theory, the centrality of the trust theory of corporations and the
law of fiduciary obligations bridged an implicitly narrow conception of
the functional possibilities of corporate governance and the larger agenda
of protecting democracy and improving public welfare. The resulting
theory and legal framework for corporate governance appealed to, or at
least did not offend, the prevailing jurisprudential orthodoxy by articulating legal arguments that were ostensibly conventional while also conducive to Berle’s broader reformist purposes.
Berle’s emphasis of fiduciary duties in corporate governance resonated in some deeper ways with the coming transformation of the regulatory state and the state’s role in economic governance. Fiduciary duties
represent a peculiar form of law that blends regulatory and contractual
characteristics; their animating ex ante normative principles are as general and abstract as their ex post adjudicative applications are specific and
concrete. The generality of fiduciary principles and norms allows sufficient flexibility to apply to the infinite variety and frequent complexity of
intracorporate disputes, while also allowing courts broad equity powers
in defining and enforcing these obligations. The abstract form of fiduciary norms and doctrine was consistent with Berle’s preference for principle-based, as opposed to rule-bound, approaches to regulating corporate and economic behavior—a long-standing theoretical and policy debate over the optimal forms of regulation that has only grown in importance.
The state’s plenary capacity to impose legal norms on the conduct
of corporate affairs, reflected in the normative generality of fiduciary
principles, also provided a conceptual template for a more encompassing
legal and institutional framework for securing equity, functionality, and
legitimacy in corporate capitalism. This vision of law reflected not only
27. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 59 (1954); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 8, at 856.
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Berle’s critical stance toward unconstrained managerial power, but also
his deeper normative and practical concerns: (1) the threat posed by corporate power (i.e., managerial power) to democratic governance, and
(2) the search for effective means to render concentrated private power
accountable to governmental authority consistent with the requirements
of social welfare and the public good. But strengthened fiduciary duties
that protect shareholder interests would only have advanced this agenda
at one level of the political economy, and only partially at that. The expansion of governmental authority and discretionary power in order to
redirect narrow managerial self-interest toward more socially beneficial
ends required an expansion of state power through the broad delegation
of regulatory authority to technocratic regulators, which in turn would
have refashioned corporate management into a new technocratic, quasipublic function.
Berle and Means’s famous work was thus not the apotheosis of
Berle’s thinking about the corporation and its role in the political economy. It instead represented a historical moment of extraordinary intellectual and political tension between a laissez-faire form of classical liberalism and the political, regulatory, institutional, and constitutional upheavals of the New Deal era that made wholesale reform possible. In this
light, it is not surprising that Berle, along with most other New Dealers,
largely abandoned concerns with corporate governance, narrowly conceived as the power relations and decision-making processes within corporations, to focus on the more thoroughgoing reconstruction and expansion of federal regulatory power and authority over economic management.
This path was further consolidated with the abandonment of the
corporatist approaches to governance and regulation in 1935–1936, the
victim of the NIRA’s incoherence, chaotic administration, and failure to
improve economic conditions. The New Deal’s initial foray into corporatism not only suffered from the immense difficulty of creating corporatist institutions from scratch, but also from intractable problems of conflict and complexity that frustrated attempts to use such institutions as a
mechanism for national economic planning and a means to foster cooperation among economic interest groups. The corporatist approach also
placed the emerging administrative state on a collision course with classical liberalism’s core tenets of individualism and competition, and with
American constitutional and legal principles. Even the New Dealers
within the Roosevelt Administration and Congress were divided over the
propriety, effectiveness, and proper implementation of an American variant of corporatism. Judicial hostility to the legal form and scope of the
delegated powers underlying the NIRA’s corporatism temporarily united
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the Court’s conservative, moderate, and progressive members in striking
it down as unconstitutional.28 Even the more progressive Justices Louis
Brandeis and Benjamin Cardozo were wary of, and ultimately opposed
to, the Roosevelt Administration’s assertion of virtually limitless power
and ability to delegate that power to large government bureaucracies that
could potentially collude with large corporations.
Thereafter, even prior to the epochal defeat of Roosevelt’s Courtpacking plan, the New Deal’s favored mechanisms of economic governance were regulatory, not corporatist. This distinctive feature of the
modern American administrative state had substantial implications for
legal and political economic development during the New Deal and postNew Deal eras. Direct federal intervention in the private sphere and the
implementation of federal economic policy and macroeconomic management largely eschewed state-imposed mechanisms of governance at
the levels of the firm, sector, and national economy. Instead, American
law took a distinctive regulatory turn, emphasizing the promulgation and
enforcement of detailed rules by agencies and other governmental bodies
granted broad powers by general enabling legislation.
Although this shift is often described as the fall of the “first” quasicorporatist New Deal and the rise of the largely regulatory “Second New
Deal,”29 the historical record of the legal reforms of the 1930s undermines this characterization. The regulatory elements of the New Deal
emerged alongside and in parallel with the more corporatist approaches
to economic governance, such as the NIRA, undertaken from 1933 to
1935. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 were vitally important regulatory initiatives of the early New Deal
period, and their primary reliance on disclosure and transparency endured as the dominant approach to financial market regulation. Though
its demarcation and enforced separation of financial markets and business lines diverged from the dominant forms of financial-sector regulation, the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act) was an exercise in
prudential regulation of systemic risk. It was not a form of corporatist
organization designed to police sectoral boundaries and restrict member28. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541–42 (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act,
ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (previously codified at 15 U.S.C. § 703)). But the Court’s decision in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936), invalidating the quasi-corporatist but sectorspecific Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (previously codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 801–27), reactivated splits between the conservative and progressive justices, foreshadowing the great jurisprudential shift toward a broad reading of the federal Commerce Clause power and
judicial deference in matters of economic regulation. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 46–47 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act against constitutional challenge).
29. For a classic statement of this characterization, see 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT, chs. 16, 21–22 (1960).
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ship in order to foster stable governance and self-regulation by market
incumbents. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the Wagner
Act), a more regulatory approach to labor relations than the NRA’s efforts to encourage labor organization and sectoral employment standards,
was introduced in Congress in early 1934, prior to the Schechter Poultry
decision, and was therefore a ready replacement after the Supreme
Court’s invalidation of the NIRA.30 The parallel tracks represented by the
corporatist and regulatory elements of the New Deal reflected the protean
and experimental character of Roosevelt’s political and policy offensives. Yet by 1935, it was clear that political support for national economic planning and the corporatist thrust of policy embodied in the
NIRA had largely dissipated as its coherence and effectiveness came into
question. The political balance of policy and legal reform shifted decisively toward more legalistic regulatory approaches to economic governance.
There is an intriguing parallel between the emerging legal structure
of the regulatory state during the New Deal and the transformation of
corporate law and governance that quickly followed the emergence of the
large industrial corporation decades earlier. With the waning of the concession theory of incorporation and the erosion of the doctrine of ultra
vires, state incorporation acts were revised to function as general enabling statutes for corporate charters, which were likewise increasingly
drafted as broad conveyances of authority to directors and officers with
few, if any, limitations on the firm’s bona fide business activities.31 Similarly, although the Supreme Court had declared wholesale delegations of
rulemaking power to be unconstitutional,32 unconstrained by any meaningful jurisdictional or substantive limits, the permissible breadth of
legislative delegations to regulatory agencies had grown dramatically by
the end of the 1930s. The expansion of regulatory authority and power,
however, also provoked a political backlash and ignited interbranch (and
intrabranch) rivalries that would spark and inform the development of

30. Cf. id. at 292 (contending that the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, Wagner Act, and
Social Security Act continued to follow the path of the “first” New Deal and “none bore the distinctive mark of the Second New Deal”); see also 2 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE
NEW DEAL: THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT, 297–315, 400–06 (describing the passage of the Social Security and Wagner Acts).
31. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 56–57, 69–71 (1970) (discussing the erosion of mandatory terms and statutory limitations on corporate organization and activities in state corporation law
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as their displacement in the 1930s by
general enabling statutes providing default rules).
32. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537.
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modern administrative law.33 A plausible explanation for these parallel
developments is that the increasing complexity of organizations in both
the private and public spheres outstripped the capacity of legislation to
govern them though detailed enactments. The increasing generality of
enabling laws was one result of this burgeoning complexity in organizational structures, operations, and tasks. The increasing complexity of
corporate affairs, on the one hand, and regulatory policies and rules, on
the other, were often mutually reinforcing and complementary, each emphasizing technocratic specialization within their respective organizations.
In the policy domain of corporate governance, the most important
of the New Deal regulatory initiatives was, of course, the development of
federal securities regulation under the administration of the SEC following the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940.34 Ironically, Berle played at most a marginal role in the design of the first two
of these laws, the drafting of which was entrusted to John Landis and
other protégés of Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter was Berle’s bitter rival, a
disciple of Brandeisian liberalism’s legalistic vision of regulation and
antagonism toward the concentration of political and economic power by
large organizations in both the public and private spheres.35 Berle’s reservations about and criticisms of the emerging regime of securities law
and regulation may thus have been influenced by personal pique over
defeats in administrative infighting, but they were also consistent with
his long-standing intellectual convictions favoring principle-based regulation and the exercise of broad, flexible governmental powers over
business. He found himself allied with Wall Street bankers in his critical
attitude toward the complex and prescriptive rule-based approach to regulation and economic governance represented by the new securities laws
and SEC rulemaking.
The Glass-Steagall Act’s separation of commercial banking and the
securities business defined the scope and permissible participants in dif33. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 260, 268–72 (1978) (analyzing the tensions between the New Deal’s expansion of
regulatory authority and established notions of the rule of law, and reviewing the resulting political
conflicts and compromises that led to the Administrative Procedure Act). Of course, for political and
constitutional reasons, regulatory-enabling statutes never achieved the level of permissiveness
reached by corporation law, with its generally contentless chartering provisions allowing firms to
pursue virtually any business activity and default rules supplied against the backdrop of legally
sanctioned opt-out powers granted to the board.
34. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006); Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a64 (2006).
35. See SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 107–08.
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ferent financial markets, but did so as a means of controlling systemic
risk and moral hazard in the financial sector. This control became even
more essential following the creation of the FDIC and bank deposit insurance to prevent bank runs like those that devastated the banking system during the early 1930s. Neither Glass-Steagall nor the new disclosure regime under federal securities regulation created or imposed anything resembling an encompassing corporatist form of associational interest representation or sectoral governance. The overriding goal of this
legislation and regulation was to enable markets, as opposed to displacing markets and contractual governance through state-sanctioned hierarchical institutions.36
Other sector-specific governmental bodies set up to regulate prices
(including interest rates in some segments of the banking sector and
commissions in securities trading) and market entry were not corporatist
in structure or operation. The New Deal’s legacies of sectoral regulation
became infamous for creating regulatory cartels of, and susceptibility to
capture by, incumbent firms.37 But corporatism is not synonymous with
capture, and regulatory capture does not transform a regulatory body into
a corporatist one. This unparalleled period of institution building and
regulatory expansion marked the true origins of the modern American
state, which was legally and institutionally distinctive and also comparatively belated. The resulting regulatory regime would transform the
American political economy, and thus the governance of the large publicly traded corporation, but it was never corporatist in its intellectual and
36. Cf. CIOFFI, supra note 14, at 43–47 (distinguishing the market-enabling form of regulation
characteristic of the United States from neocorporatist forms of regulation and governance that displace contractual and market relations).
37. Indeed, this form of regulation would later spark a political backlash that began the process
of deregulation during the 1970s, and it was directed at precisely those sectors where regulatory
cartels and capture had turned the regulatory apparatus into a means of rent-seeking contrary to the
public good. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979) (critiquing post-New Deal “interest group liberalism” as leading to
regulatory and state capture by well-organized, resource-rich groups and as corrosive of American
liberalism as a governing philosophy and programmatic agenda); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (critiquing regulation as a form of
“state failure” and private rent-seeking, focusing on protected markets and regulatory cartels created
and entrenched by regulation that favors large firms and government officials due to their coherent
interests, organizational advantages, and control over economic resources and coercive state power);
cf. STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (discussing theoretical regulation
dismissing the “excess competition” theory of regulation influential during the New Deal and postwar eras, and criticizing price and market entry and allocation regulation as often “mismatched” to
sector-specific policy problems); MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF
DEREGULATION (1985) (empirical study of deregulation of the trucking, airline, and rail sectors
arguing that bureaucrats’ policy preferences and beliefs often facilitated deregulation in ways that
deviated from the narrow economic interests underlying economic models and public-choice theories of regulation).
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programmatic origins or in its later development. The distinctiveness of
the American political–economic model and its failure to develop along a
neocorporatist path is elucidated by the concept and development of
countervailing power in the American economy during the postwar era.
IV. COUNTERVAILING POWER, AMERICAN LIBERALISM, AND THE RISE
AND FALL OF THE POST-NEW DEAL ORDER
The hegemonic dominance of shareholder primacy in legal and policy discourse followed the decay and disintegration of the New Deal coalition during the latter 1960s, the collapse of the postwar “labor-capital
accord” and Keynesian macroeconomic policy in the 1970s, and the ascendance of neoliberalism and the financial sector in politics and business during the 1980s. John Kenneth Galbraith’s theory and presciently
incisive analysis of countervailing power’s strengths and weaknesses
reveals how distinct the American political economy was, structurally
and functionally, from a neocorporatist regime and why that political
economic order turned out to be so fragile.38 Relations of countervailing
power among increasingly organized opposing interests were a defining
feature of the American political economy and the governance of large
public firms during the New Deal and post-New Deal eras. The most important of these opposing forces—managers, shareholders and other financial interests, strong unions and organized labor relations, and regulators and other officials of the administrative state—were the most influential groups within the polity. Their power was instantiated and exercised largely within the private sphere, autonomously from the state.
Galbraith set out an economic logic by which countervailing power
proliferated throughout the political economy, with the organized power
of an existing group driving the formation of an opposing group as
weaker constituencies sought to organize to more effectively bargain
with their more powerful and organized counterparts. The import of
countervailing power to corporate governance, as well as Berle’s contributions to its theory and practice, is threefold. First, countervailing power as manifest in the postwar era was largely, if not entirely, the product
of voluntarist market-driven organization within the private sphere.
Second, countervailing power was categorically distinct from corporatist
and neocorporatist forms of political economic organization and consistent with Berle’s own thinking about economic power and governance,
38. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER (Sentry ed., 1962) (1952) [hereinafter GALBRAITH, COUNTERVAILING POWER]. Though his
later books, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958) and THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967), became far
more famous, Countervailing Power introduced many, and arguably most, of the ideas and themes
that he would popularize in his later work.
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including the governance of the firm. Third, Galbraith also noted that the
flaws of countervailing power as a form of economic ordering made it
both prone and vulnerable to the inflationary spirals that would ultimately prove to be its undoing.
Galbraith sought to explain the apparent “paradox of the unexercised power of the large corporation.” He argued that even as competition withered as a constraint on large, oligopolistic firms and economic
power became increasingly concentrated among their managers, the exercise of that concentrated power had not become oppressive or dysfunctional in practice as many (including Berle) had feared.39 The restraints
on private economic power took the form of countervailing power, “nurtured by the same process of concentration which impaired or destroyed
competition,” which held in check the power of large corporations and
those who ran them.40 Galbraith further argued that under relations of
industrial capitalism:
[P]rivate economic power is held in check by . . . those who are subject to it. The first begets the second. . . . The two develop together,
not in precise step but in such manner that there can be no doubt
that the one is in response to the other.41

An important implication follows from the logic of mutual concentration and dyadic opposition set out by Galbraith. Just as competition in
neoclassical markets is self-generating and self-regulating:
Countervailing power is also a self-generating force . . . the tendency of power to be organized in response to a given position of power is the vital characteristic of the phenomenon . . . . [P]ower on one
side of a market creates both the need for, and the prospect of reward to, the exercise of countervailing power from the other side.
This means that, as a common rule, we can rely on countervailing
power to appear as a curb on economic power.42

This theory of self-generating countervailing power thus describes
an economic system that is largely self-regulating, and therefore does not
require pervasive and intensive state intervention and control of private
economic matters. By happy operation of this functionalist logic, Galbraith argued that the largely self-regulating character of the market and
private sector remained intact, though in a new form that made a virtue
39. GALBRAITH, COUNTERVAILING POWER, supra note 38, at 108–09. Although he pronounces
optimism that this salutary state of affairs could be maintained if the lessons of countervailing power
were learned and properly applied, he also raises serious concerns about political capacities to do
just that.
40. Id. at 111.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 113.
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of large-scale organizations and concentrated power. This theory of
largely spontaneous, organizationally based ordering is quite close to
Berle’s own conception of groups, functionally specialized organizations, and social forces as beneficially balanced in “equipoise.”43 Liberal
economics was reconciled with economic modernity, preserving the core
attributes of a market-driven economy and rendering moot much of the
debate over the appropriate extent of state intervention in the economy.
The postwar political economy was not hurtling inexorably down the
road to socialism and serfdom, but was instead on the stable path toward
the technocratic management of countervailing power relations.
This conception of how power and conflict are structured in an industrial society (at least during the postwar decades) follows neither the
Madisonian vision of ever-splintering factions with divergent interests
cycling through ever-changing pluralist coalitions,44 nor the more deliberately structured and state-sanctioned designation, empowerment, or
concertation of groups characterizing neocorporatist political economies.
What differentiated the logic of countervailing power from pluralism was
(1) the relentless movement toward organization and centralization of
power and (2) the developmental process of dyadic opposition to the
power of other organized interests. Like Berle’s vision of the corporation
embedded within the constraints and demands of the regulatory state,
Galbraith’s conception of countervailing power accepts large-scale organizations as historical facts. Both were simultaneously modern and
quintessential reflections of the postwar consensus among much of the
American elite.
Galbraith did recognize that the countervailing group could be too
small or weak to organize effectively. In such cases, the theory of countervailing power provided a justification for state action through regulation.45 Federal labor relations laws promoting union organization and
43. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 88, 92. But when comparing it to
Galbraith’s dynamic understanding of countervailing power, Berle’s conception of equipoise appears
essentially static, with its balance undisturbed and founded on public consensus on social values and
collective goals.
44. In another example of isomorphic developments across the public–private divide, the private sphere structured by relations of countervailing power loses its fragmented pluralist character,
and it begins to resemble the structural bargaining relationships within the political institutions and
the constitutional structure of the public sphere.
45. But the move from “self-generating” countervailing power to state intervention that creates
or imitates its hypothetical effects opens an array of ambiguities and practical problems in application. First, the theory contains no clear criteria for determining when one group has acquired sufficient power, or when another group has demonstrated a sufficient incapacity to organize, that would
warrant legislative or regulatory action. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the theory
does not require that the countervailing power be in opposing groups, leaving the standards for determining acceptable and unacceptable power differentials unclear as a matter of theory and policy.
Second, the appropriate form of governmental action remained unclear, as well. There are govern-
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collective bargaining were the most critical, controversial, and divisive
manifestation of governmental intervention to promote countervailing
power. Indeed, just as organized labor relations are central to neocorporatist institutional theory and practices, they were foundational to the
countervailing power relations of the postwar American political economy. And the American labor relations regime proved to be the weak
point in the architecture of countervailing power because of structural
flaws in the legal framework, firm-level practices, and macroeconomic
consequences of organized labor relations that were barely perceptible in
the 1950s, but which grew more glaring by the 1970s.
Galbraith recognized that while countervailing power in labor relations functions well under conditions of weak demand by preventing employers from driving worker incomes down, under inflationary conditions it creates a de facto coalition between management and labor to
continuously raise wage levels and pass the added expenses along as
price increases that consumers are willing to bear given the prevailing
conditions of high demand.46 This transforms a virtuous cycle of stabilizing employment and equitable division of economic surplus into a vicious cycle tending toward a destructive inflationary spiral. Keynesian
fiscal policy—a lynchpin of the postwar economy and macroeconomic
management—magnifies this problem of inflation.47 Government spending increases aggregate demand, but in the real world of politics, expansionary fiscal policy is unlikely to be, and in fact was not, conducted
countercyclically as called for by Keynesian theory. Political incentives
favor countercyclical spending during downturns, but they militate
against countercyclical spending cuts or tax increases during economic
booms.48 The result is a tendency to ratchet up fiscal policy and thus inflation.
Strong unions and oligopolistic employers within a fragmented
(i.e., noncorporatist or otherwise uncoordinated and unrestrained) collective bargaining framework further accelerate inflation by ratcheting wage
levels upward. The costs of inflation are partially externalized onto the
mental interventions that serve to promote organization, such as labor laws, policies fostering sectoral consolidation (or collusion?), or laws facilitating the formation of advocacy associations. But
there are also legal rules, such as minimum wage or prevailing wage and hours laws, that appear to
deliver the very benefits that would have been enjoyed by the weaker group had it been able to organize sufficiently to achieve a desirable degree of countervailing power. The theory of countervailing power may have restated the self-regulating dynamics of the private sphere in a new form, but it
also restated the policy dilemmas of when and how much regulatory intervention should be deployed
in a new form without supplying clear solutions to those dilemmas.
46. GALBRAITH, COUNTERVAILING POWER, supra note 38, at 128–34.
47. See id. at 187–201.
48. Id. at 194–95. Likewise, political incentives favor inflationary deficit spending because
politicians are far more inclined to spend than raise taxes to finance that spending. Id.
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rest of society while the negotiating partners retain all gains accruing
from agreement. These mutually reinforcing inflationary tendencies ultimately contributed to the destabilization and erosion of the postwar political economic order in the United States during the 1970s. The inflationary tendencies built into the postwar American political economy
presented an increasingly serious political and policy problem of inadequate restraints.49 Countries with neocorporatist labor relations and collective bargaining at the national or sectoral levels had more effective
institutional restraints to curtail inflationary spirals because the more encompassing scope of wage bargains between industrial unions and employer associations limits the parties’ ability to externalize the costs of
inflation outside their membership. In contrast, the problem of inflation
could not be solved satisfactorily within American institutional arrangements.
The exceptional fragmentation of the American labor movement
and the narrow coverage of collective bargaining agreements was, in
part, the consequence of the voluntaristic form of unionization and decentralized bargaining under federal labor laws. The harsh restrictions on
labor-organizing tactics imposed by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the
product of a bitter political fight over the proper balance of countervailing power, further impeded union organization. By impeding union organization, these restrictions also removed any possibility of more encompassing collective bargaining arrangements that have the paradoxical
effect of enabling and encouraging wage moderation.50 From its peacetime peak of approximately 35% in the mid-1950s, union density in the
United States declined continuously, plummeting during the 1980s until
sliding to barely 7% of the private nonagricultural workforce in 2009.51
Low and declining union density reinforced the highly decentralized bargaining structure and the perverse inefficiencies of American “job control” unionism that rigidly fixed job titles, responsibilities, and work
49. See id. at 194–201.
50. Where wage bargaining covers a larger percentage of the workforce, industrial unions and
employer associations have an incentive to practice wage restraint because they internalize more of
the inflationary costs of their bargains. Conversely, highly fragmented bargaining produces a classic
negative externality problem in which union and management negotiators do not internalize the
potential inflationary consequences of collective agreements. Each individual contract generates a
small, often imperceptible, share of inflation, and these costs are largely borne by the population as a
whole. The resultant incentive structure encourages a proliferation of inflationary wage bargains (at
least where a significant proportion of the workforce is covered by collective agreements) that tends
to increase the overall inflation rate and its aggregate costs, and yet intensifies labor demands for
further wage increases.
51. See Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database
from the Current Population Survey, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 349 (2003), available at
http://unionstats.gsu.edu/ (describing the data about union membership, coverage, density, and employment among private sector nonagricultural workers from 1973–2009).
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rules through the negotiation of detailed labor contracts.52 The irony was
that the weakness of unions not only fueled inflation, but also often impaired productivity and efficiency, and both dynamics contributed to the
downward spiral of organized labor during the 1970s and 1980s.53 On the
other hand, in countries with neocorporatist forms of labor organization
and industrial relations, union density and collective bargaining coverage
remained far more resilient (though both measures indicate that organized labor relations have come under pressure in those countries, as
well, though not to the same disastrous degree as in the United States).
This collapse of union strength altered the political terrain of the American political economy. As one of the pillars of the New Deal and postwar
order crumbled, the power of financial interests ascended to challenge
managerialism. The conflicts over corporate takeovers during the 1980s
and early 1990s illustrate this transformation vividly.
V. TAKEOVERS, FINANCE CAPITALISM, AND
PSEUDO-STAKEHOLDER POLITICS
During the New Deal and postwar period that ended in the 1980s,
shareholders were but one poorly organized group more than counterbalanced by an array of others contending for political, legal, and economic
advantage. Shareholder primacy, lying inchoate within fiduciary duties,
was but one normative element in a complex set of political, legal, and
economic arrangements, and could not become effective and enforceable
without destabilizing (or absent the prior destabilization) the broader political economic structure. The ideological triumph of shareholder primacy and the increasing influence and priority accorded to the pursuit of
shareholder value in legal norms, policy discourse, and managerial strategy was contingent on the collapse of countervailing power. In its place
emerged a crisis-prone form of finance capitalism marked by an increasingly skewed redistribution of income, wealth, and power toward those
privileged by their control over corporations and financial capital. The
52. For the classic analysis of the emergence and legal-institutional logic of “business” or “job
control” unionism in the United States, see Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character
of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1971). For an exhaustive theoretical and empirical update and elaboration on Bok’s account, see Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1. In contrast to the
American case, labor relations in more corporatist countries, where labor bargains from a relatively
stronger position and agreements are often sectoral or national, tend to rely on broader job classifications and enable more flexible reallocation of labor inside of firms. See, e.g., Richard M. Locke, The
Transformation of Industrial Relations? A Cross-National Review, in THE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 9 (Lowell Turner & Kirsten S. Wever eds., 1995).
53. A more comprehensive discussion of the manifold and complex causes of organized labor’s
decline in the United States is beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent overview of the
issue, see generally Rogers, supra note 52.
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1980s are generally, and accurately, regarded as the tipping point when
the deterioration of the New Deal and postwar order finally gave way to
the succeeding era of neoliberalism. During the 1980s and early 1990s,
corporate takeovers triggered intense political and legal conflicts over the
legal treatment of shareholder rights, managerial power, and stakeholder
interests.54 These struggles are particularly revealing of the final breakdown of the postwar era’s configuration of countervailing power and the
role of law in constituting the power relations of the new neoliberal order.
Though hostile takeovers only accounted for approximately 14% of
all corporate control transactions in the United States between 1980 and
1989, nearly half of all major American firms received a takeover bid
during the decade.55 The disproportionate impact of hostile takeovers on
large, highly visible public corporations magnified the political and economic stakes involved in these battles for control.56 Hostile takeovers,
along with other mergers and acquisitions, also involved vastly greater
amounts of money than earlier merger waves, and even exceeded (in inflation-adjusted dollars) the enormous sums exchanged during the extraordinary merger boom of the 1990s.57 A fierce struggle over a new
balance of countervailing power was framed as a shift from the separa54. Although the 1980s were exceptional in terms of M&A activity, this was only one of five
periods in which mergers and acquisitions soared. There had been three great merger “waves” in
American economic history prior to the 1980s, and at least one thereafter:
The first great merger wave in the United States followed the depression of the late 19th
century and was fueled by growth and infrastructure. The second merger wave sprouted
during the economic boom that followed the First World War and was driven by an abundant supply of investment capital. The third merger wave, set in the late 1960s, was
primarily motivated by the desire for diversification. This was the wave of conglomeration, with very large firms possessing market share in extremely diverse industries. The
diversification of large conglomerates became so questionable that the fourth merger
wave, that of the 1980s, served to restructure many conglomerates created during the
third wave. The 1990s have emerged to produce a fifth wave of corporate acquisitions.
This wave has seen consolidation of market share and acquisition of technology.
Glenn Yago et al., A Tale of Two Decades: Corporate Control Changes in the ’80s and ’90s, 21
MILKEN INST. POLICY BRIEF 1, 1–2 (Nov. 23, 2000), http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/two
decad.pdf; see also id. at 4–8, chart 1. One might add the private equity acquisition boom of 2002–
2007 to this list. Like the M&A boom of the 1990s, however, it did not represent a major structural
change in the economy and was eclipsed in significance by the huge housing and debt bubbles of
that decade.
55. Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 104–05 (2001); see also Monika Schnitzer, Hostile versus Friendly
Takeovers, 63 ECONOMICA 37, 54 n.1 (1996) (18% of all attempted mergers and acquisitions by
volume were hostile from 1985–1989).
56. Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, supra note 55, identify the large-firm bias of hostile takeover attempts during the 1980s, noting that their analysis “suggests that hostile activity was practically non-existent among the smaller, lesser-known companies.” Id. at 106.
57. See Yago et al., supra note 54, at 10, 16, chart 10.
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tion of ownership and control to a market for control. Berle’s engine of
managerial power had become contested terrain, and fiduciary duties of
directors, in which he had placed such hope, became a recurrent legal
object of the battles to control it.
Counsel for would-be acquirers urged courts to articulate and enforce norms of shareholder primacy within the law of fiduciary duties to
invalidate antitakeover defenses and compel boards to accept takeover
bids, while targets invoked the implicit stakeholder norms of the postwar
era to legitimate their defensive tactics. Not surprisingly, interest groups,
legislatures, and courts reacted to hostile takeovers by enabling incumbent boards and managers to employ antitakeover defenses and undermined the institutional conditions of corporate governance on which hostile acquisition strategies relied.58 Perhaps the most striking and revealing
political response to the takeover wave was the enactment of state “corporate constituency” (or stakeholder) statutes that authorized directors
and managers to take the interests of employees, suppliers, communities,
and other stakeholders in the firm into account when responding to takeover attempts. But these laws gave no enforceable rights or governance
voice to these nonshareholder groups, and the omission illuminates the
true allocation of power in the American political economy. In Delaware,
by far the most important jurisdiction for corporation law, the balance of
power between managerial interests and the newly assertive financial
sector prevented the adoption of an antitakeover statute and left the
courts to develop a complex and shifting body of case law that repeatedly
readjusted the balance of managerial and shareholder interests in adjudicating the legality of antitakeover defenses.59
A. Corporation Law Federalism and the Fiduciary Conundrum
The United States is unique among the advanced industrialized
countries in that its corporation law is primarily made and enforced at the
state level. In contrast to other advanced industrial countries, the United
States has no national corporation law. American federalism relegates the
chartering of corporations and the ordering of their internal governance
to the sphere of state legislation, while the federal government has taken
the lead role in securities regulation and labor law. This long-established
division of legal and political competencies has produced a unique institutional dynamic in the development of the corporate governance system
as a whole. With the increasing incidence of hostile takeovers during the
1980s, this fragmentation of governmental authority produced conflicts
58. See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993).
59. Id.
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over the proper scope of state corporation law and its tensions with federal constitutional and statutory commitments to unified national markets—whether for finance, securities, or firms.
In many states, antitakeover statutes were the principal political response to the upheavals wrought by the hostile takeover era and the
traumatic transition from the relative stability of the postwar economic
order to the far more volatile era of neoliberal finance capitalism.60 Even
in the absence of a strong antitakeover statute in Delaware, that state
courts’ highly complex—and frequently unstable—case law developed
in the shadow of the same political pressures. Thus, it sought to balance
the same conflicting normative and practical imperatives that informed
antitakeover statutes: the powers of directors and managers to exercise
their business judgment in the conduct of firm affairs (including the sale
of the firm and amending corporate charters and bylaws) versus the fundamental financial and governance interests of shareholders. In state legislatures, the longstanding American tradition of anti-financier populism61 enabled managerial elites to mobilize labor and the public at large
against shareholder interests as represented by financiers and financial
institutions involved in hostile takeovers. Consequently, legislation designed to curb takeovers consistently embodied a balance of interestgroup power in state politics that tilted toward incumbent management.
The political and legal reaction to the threat of hostile takeovers
generated three major waves of antitakeover statutes. The merger boom
of the 1960s and subsequent fears of hostile takeovers and proxy battles
resulted in the passage of the federal Williams Act in 1968,62 which required public disclosure of the acquisition of large stakes in publicly
traded corporations, and the adoption of antitakeover statutes by thirtyseven states prior to 1982.63 The hostile takeover boom of the mid- to
late 1980s triggered the last two of these waves, which overlapped and
extended into the early 1990s. Along with potent judicially sanctioned
antitakeover devices, these statutes effectively moderated (though they
did not eliminate) the threat posed by the increasing power of finance to
the managerialism of the status quo ante.
60. In this sense, Martin Lipton’s description of an emergent form of “finance corporatism”
misses the fundamental character of the financially driven transformation of American corporate
capitalism as founded on neoliberal market ideology and elevating the market over the hierarchical
corporate firm as the dominant institution in economic life. See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1987).
61. See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e), 78n(d)–(f) (2010).
63. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113
(1987).
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In 1982, the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Edgar v. MITE
Corp. invalidated an Illinois antitakeover statute (and by implication other similar early state antitakeover statutes) as preempted by the Williams
Act and unconstitutional under the “silent Commerce Clause” doctrine
because its protectionist bias against out-of-state bidders unreasonably
burdened interstate commerce.64 Within months of the MITE ruling, the
states began passing a “second generation” of antitakeover statutes.65 The
momentum of the antitakeover legislation strengthened after 1987 when
the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America to at least some forms of antitakeover legislation, reversing
the course it had set in MITE.66 The states took advantage of this new
latitude by enacting a veritable flood of antitakeover legislation purportedly designed to protect corporations chartered under their corporate
law, but primarily benefitting incumbent mangers.67
The third generation of antitakeover statutes, the “corporate constituency” statutes, (also called “directors’ duties” or “stakeholder” statutes) became the most widely adopted form of all.68 A corporate constituency statute allows managers and directors to invoke nonshareholder
interests in rejecting or defending against a hostile tender offer. They
recognized and legitimated the interests of multiple corporate constituencies, ranging from shareholders to employees, from creditors to suppliers
to customers, from local communities to the American economy as a
whole. Like other types of antitakeover statutes, they provide an effective
64. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982).
65. Roberta Romano notes that the number of forms taken reflected the “uncertainty regarding
the scope of constitutional constraint imposed by MITE rather than by disagreement concerning the
most effective regulation.” Romano, supra note 63, at 115.
66. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 85–86 (1987).
67. In 1988, John C. Coffee, Jr. wrote:
[T]here has been an epidemic-like character to the spread of state antitakeover legislation;
a majority of the states have now enacted a ‘second generation’ statute in the wake of
Edgar v. MITE Corp. and . . . many of these states (or others) may soon move to a ‘third
generation’ statute after CTS . . . . This activism at the state level contrasts sharply with
the relative caution being shown by the Congress. . . . [T]he states—particularly those in
the ‘Rustbelt’ . . . have become protective havens for target corporations, while the Congress has tended more toward neutrality. For many—including most academics—the
prospect of state regulation of tender offers threatens a Balkanized world in which a national securities market is gradually fragmented, special interest legislation is adopted
under the transparent guise of ‘protecting’ shareholders and the disciplinary capacity of
the hostile takeover is gradually dulled.
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 436.
68. States adopted the first constituency statutes contemporaneously with a variety of secondgeneration antitakeover statutes. Yet constituency statutes continued to multiply in number and
constituted a third generation unto themselves after the second-generation statutes and other antitakeover defenses had already diminished the threat of takeovers.
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means of defense against hostile takeovers. But corporate constituency
statutes represented a departure from traditional corporate law principles.
The constituency statute originated in Pennsylvania in 1983,69 where
managerial and labor interests feared that takeovers would threaten local
corporations and herald an acceleration of deindustrialization as financially weakened firms fell to raiders.70 By the early 1990s, twenty-nine
states had enacted constituency statutes,71 and by 2000, that number had
grown to thirty-two.72 The extraordinary political success of corporate
constituency statutes therefore cannot be attributed to special-interest
pleading by individual firms or to rust belt anxieties. Moreover, corporate constituency statutes proliferated even as the threat from hostile takeovers was declining to the point they had largely ceased, suggesting
that recognizing the interests of multiple corporate constituencies has an
enduring political appeal. These laws targeted the substantive content of

69. Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No. 1983-92, § 1(B), 1983 Pa. Laws 395 (codified at 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 515 (1995), amended by 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1715, 1716 (1990)).
70. See Ronald J. Gilson, Comment on Roe, in THE DEAL DECADE, supra note 58, at 358; Roe,
supra note 58, at 339–40; Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 26 n.47, 28 & nn.61–63 (1992).
71. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward
Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1540–45 (1991).
72. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1086 n.9, app. (2000). Matheson and Olson list twenty-nine states as
having enacted constituency statutes as of 1991: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Matheson & Olson, supra
note 71, at 1425. Adams and Matheson note that four more states had adopted constituency statutes
between 1991 and 2000: Maryland, Nevada, North Dakota, and Vermont. Adams & Matheson,
supra. The Arizona and Virginia statutes do not specify the nonshareholder constituencies whose
interests may be taken into account by directors, but instead refer to the long-term and short-term
interests of the firm (Arizona) and interests in the “continued independence” of the corporation (both
Arizona and Virginia). Because the practical effect of the statutes is the same as a constituency statute, they are included here. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33756 (2011), amended by 2010 Conn. Pub. Acts 10-35 § 10; FLA. STAT. § 607.0830 (2010); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-202 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-1602
(1999); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (1983); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2009); IOWA CODE
§ 491.101B (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210 (LexisNexis 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:92 (1994); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-A, § 716 (repealed 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (1996); MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.251 (1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (1986); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 21-2432 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West
1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35 (1983); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1954); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 60.357 (1988); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, § 8.30 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (1999); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (1992); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830 (1999).
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fiduciary duties and the norm of shareholder primacy to an unprecedented degree.
Paradoxically, the legal recognition of nonshareholder interests
served only to entrench and empower management. The vast majority of
constituency statutes frame directors’ duties to consider nonshareholder
interests in permissive terms.73 While recognizing the legitimacy of nonshareholder interests in corporate governance, the statutes did not grant
these constituencies any legally enforceable rights, let alone representation or voice in firm governance, but they did give managers and directors a wealth of legal justifications for decisions arguably adverse to
shareholder interests.74 To put the matter in principal–agent terms, where
more than one principal is recognized, the agent can justify a variety of
possible decisions that cannot be predictably enforced by reference to
legal norms. Constituency statutes exploited for managerial ends present
the “too many masters” problem of reconciling or ranking the competing
and often incommensurate interests of multiple constituencies.75 The debate over constituency statutes thus recapitulated Berle’s concerns in the
Berle–Dodd debate, but this time the debate was played out in legislative
politics and litigation rather than the Harvard Law Review.
Managerial interests and organized labor spearheaded the political
support for constituency statutes. They were better organized than the
smaller, more diffuse, and disorganized groups representing other stakeholder constituencies (e.g., local communities, suppliers, customers) and
generally had stronger ties to state and local politicians than to financial
interests. Labor, however, occupied a subordinate position in the antitakeover alliance. By the 1980s, unions had lost far too much political and
economic strength to push for enforceable governance rights or formal
representation in the institutions of firm governance. Labor occupied the
position of “rule taker,” and served as a legitimating fig leaf for managerial power.76
73. In fact, the Georgia, Indiana, New York, and Pennsylvania statutes expressly deny that they
create any enforceable rights or causes of action on behalf of nonshareholder constituencies. The
Arizona, Connecticut, and Idaho constituency statutes contain language mandating consideration of
nonshareholder interests or the long-term interests of the corporation (as opposed to short-term interests of current shareholders). Yet these statutes did not create any mechanisms for enforcement of
this consideration by the constituencies, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how they could.
74. For a comparison with the European conception of “corporate constituencies,” see Alfred
F. Conard, Corporate Constituencies in Western Europe, 21 STETSON L. REV. 73 (1991).
75. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23,
31–32 (1991).
76. See Orts, supra note 70, at 25 n.47 (quoting Democratic state senators in Pennsylvania
during the debate over the state’s constituency statute observing that although this was a law advocated by and benefiting “big business,” it also provided protection to labor and local economic interests). Both the state chamber of commerce and the AFL-CIO pushed for the 1990 amendments that
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Constituency statutes embodied the balance of interest groups’ political power at the state level and their resonance with prevailing popular values favoring economic stability and security over higher aggregate
levels of macroeconomic growth or corporate efficiency.77 Politics at the
state level empowered corporations chartered in a given state, as well as
local unions, local politicians and community representatives, and particularistic local grass roots organizations. These local interests prevailed
over distant financial institutions and a nationally diffuse class of shareholders in the torrent of legislative politics unleashed in opposition to
hostile takeovers and the growing economic power of financial capital.
Notwithstanding specific instances of managerial rent-seeking through
state legislation, the wave of antitakeover statutes passed by the states
suggested that a far more powerful and pervasive alignment of interests
and beliefs drove the political response to takeovers. Further, this new
configuration of political forces seeking to constrain the power of financial interests and market pressures proved to be enduring. Rather than
dying down at the end of the 1980s along with the takeover wave, the
politics of company law and corporate governance at the state level not
only defended antitakeover statutes against repeal, but also continued to
generate new statutes through the mid-1990s. American federalism, as
construed by the Supreme Court in CTS, supplied managers and labor
with the avenue of state politics to achieve their objectives, and they used
it to alter the terrain of American corporate law.
The overwhelming state responses to takeovers contrasted with the
absence of any significant congressional action. In contrast to the political alignments favoring antitakeover laws at the state level, no political
consensus or sufficiently dominant interest-group coalition emerged at
the national level to support federal takeover legislation. Hence, Wall
Street interests were unable to press Congress to preempt state antitakeover law, while managers and labor were incapable of pushing through
a federal antitakeover law. This also accounts for the striking difference
between the widespread antitakeover legislation passed by states, where
localized interests are more powerful, and the almost complete absence
of such legislation in federal statutory and regulatory law.78 The entrenched structural legacy of federalism also constrained federal policy.
Federal legislation in the takeover area would directly intrude on the traditional prerogatives and function of the states as the source of corporate
strengthened the protective features of the Pennsylvania statute. Id.; see also 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1715, 1716 (West 2001); Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON L. REV. 197, 220 (1991).
77. Cf. Roe, supra note 58.
78. See id. at 337; Coffee, supra note 67, at 435–36.
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law in the federal system. No legislation could emerge from a fragmented congressional legislative process that tends to protect localized
interests and discourage substantial reform. The internal fragmentation of
the congressional committee system and the veto points created by Senate rules consistently hampered federal lawmakers. This structural characteristic of American politics impeded coherent policymaking on a
subject implicating intensely local interests.
Constituency statutes reflected the balance of political and economic power in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s, and this balance continued to favor managerial interests. Ironically, constituency
statutes protected managers by dissolving fiduciary duties just as many
scholars, professionals, and policymakers were proclaiming the advent of
shareholder capitalism and a growing corporate governance movement
began to identify and champion conceptions of shareholder value and
shareholder primacy as central features of the American economy. While
economists, law and economics scholars, and professionals were raising
shareholder value and shareholder primacy to the level of first principles,
the state legislatures were hollowing out fiduciary duties to shareholders
and undermining the image of American corporate governance as the
embodiment of shareholder primacy. Despite the prevailing rhetoric and
theories of the past twenty years, legislative outcomes indicate that the
politics of corporate governance in the United States has actually favored
management to a striking degree. Paradoxically, the decade commonly
regarded as the origin of a new form of shareholder capitalism, from the
early 1980s to the early 1990s, was accompanied by a transformation of
the statutory landscape that diluted fiduciary duties and the norm of
shareholder primacy to an extent never before seen in American legal
history.
Constituency statutes, along with other varieties of antitakeover statutes, grant greater discretionary power to corporate boards as guardians
of the interests of the firm as an ongoing entity. With the recognition of
multiple constituencies, these interests diverged from those of shareholders. Constituency statutes thus granted directors and corporate officers
broader discretion—and imposed fewer fiduciary constraints—in framing and making decisions on behalf of the firm. The recognition of nonshareholder interests in fiduciary law enfeebled an already weak constraint on managerial and directorial conduct. The spread of these statutes (and the more limited recognition of nonshareholder interests in
Delaware case law on takeovers) left a crucial gap in the law’s protection
of shareholders, but did little to advance the broader social interests that
legitimated them and provided their political appeal.
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Nonshareholder constituencies got little from this weakening of fiduciary protections for shareholders—not even a seat at the corporation’s
governance table. Jonathan Springer concluded a comprehensive review
of the impact of constituency statutes with an incisive political economic
commentary that parallels Berle’s abandonment of corporation law and
governance as a means of reform in favor of expanded regulatory power:
Proponents of constituency statutes would better serve the interests
they seek to advance by focusing on other measures. Constituency
statutes arguably detract attention from more promising measures of
change such as measures with potential to change not only whose
interests may be legally considered, but who also makes corporate
decisions. . . . Although it is true that preventing takeovers may ultimately benefit constituency groups by forestalling plant closures,
the fact that these statutes are invoked by directors casually, perhaps
sometimes even cynically, does little to advance the case for consideration of constituent interests in corporate law. . . . “However
radical shareholder laws appear to shareholder rights advocates, and
however hopefully they are viewed by worker rights advocates,”
writes Joseph Singer, “stakeholder laws are not radical enough in altering corporate governance to protect the legitimate interests that
workers have in democratic economic institutions.”79

As a consequence of the political battles over takeovers, the board
of directors had become a far more important institution in American
capitalism by the 1990s,80 even as the clarity and coherence of the fiduciary duties that bound them became ever more diffuse and indeterminate. Most states effected this disintegration of fiduciary duties through
statutory means. In Delaware, the development of takeover and corporate
governance law proceeded in the state courts, where judges grappled
with the conceptual core and practical implications of fiduciary duties
and corporate governance. The travails of the Delaware courts reveal the
difficulties of addressing governance problems through a rights-based
adjudicatory system.
B. The Conundrum Continued: Interests, Time Horizons,
and the Problem of the Paramounts
The pair of cases that most clearly reveal the conceptual contradictions within Delaware takeover law and the depths of the tensions be79. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears,
1999 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 85, 123–24 (quoting Joseph William Singer, Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 475, 505 (1993)).
80. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (2008) (elaborating a theory of “director supremacy” in corporate governance law).
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tween shareholder primacy and the practical and political forces of managerialism were not decided until the early 1990s—after the hostile
takeover wave had ended. The Delaware Supreme Court issued a pair of
decisions that encapsulated, and in some ways recapitulated, the problem
first confronted in the tension between judicial deference to managerialism and stakeholder interests, on the one hand, and enhanced judicial
scrutiny and resurgent shareholder primacy, on the other. Ironically, both
cases involved Paramount Communications, and in both cases, the company lost.
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (Paramount v.
Time), the Delaware Supreme Court held that management and the board
may lawfully reject a takeover bid when the board believes in good faith
that its commitment to an established long-term business strategy is in
the long-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders.81 In Paramount v. Time, Time’s management had been working out a comprehensive business strategy since the early 1980s, and had been involved in
protracted negotiations with Warner Communications over a merger of
equals.82 Two weeks prior to the scheduled shareholder vote on the
Time–Warner merger, Paramount launched a hostile takeover bid for
Time. Time rejected the offer and restructured the terms of its merger
agreement with Warner to prevent Paramount from breaking up the
planned merger.83 In litigation, Paramount claimed that Time’s directors
had breached their fiduciary duties to the company’s shareholders by
rejecting its more generous offer. Calling the shareholder primacy theory
into question, the court ruled that the Time board had not decided to sell
the company by agreeing to a merger of equals and, therefore, the board
could consider broader nonshareholder interests in rejecting a takeover
offer.84 Time had chosen Warner for reasons of institutional cultural
compatibility and quite deliberately and consciously structured the deal
with Warner to preserve the editorial autonomy, “identity[,] and culture”
that its board and managers regarded as essential to its journalistic success.
The court’s decision and reasoning relied on the recognition of two
factors that bedevil the legal analysis of takeovers and corporate governance generally: (1) the legitimacy of nonshareholder interests and
(2) the desirability of pursuing long-term over short-term growth and
profitability. The court noted that “Delaware law imposes on a board of
81. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990).
82. A lengthy recitation of the facts of the case is contained in the Delaware Supreme Court’s
opinion. Id. at 1143–49.
83. Id. at 1148–49.
84. See id. at 1151, 1153–54.
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directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation”85 and “[t]his broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a
corporate course of action, including time frame . . . .”86 Accordingly,
under the Delaware Supreme Court’s formulation, the courts do not defer
simply to the board’s long-term strategic plans, but to the selection of the
strategic time frame and the plans developed within it. In Paramount v.
Time, the board rendered a reasonable business judgment in rejecting a
tender offer that conflicted with an established long-term business strategy.
The court directly confronted and rejected the shareholder primacy
view. It held that a board is reasonable in refusing the shareholders even
the opportunity to consider such an offer. In doing so, it ruled that the
fundamental “power of corporate governance” lies with the board of directors:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to
the stockholders’ duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary
duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a
time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not
be delegated to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate
strategy.87

Under Paramount v. Time, shareholders as an interest group are
neither primary nor sovereign in corporate governance. While rejecting
quasi-political conceptions of shareholder sovereignty, the court emphasized board autonomy in corporate governance. It invoked the interests
of nonshareholder corporate constituencies as relevant concerns in corporate governance,88 and it noted that courts cannot apply a mathematical
85. Id. at 1150 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983)).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1154 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
173 (Del. 1986)). Compare, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–60 n.2 (Del.
Ch. 1988), with Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch. 1987) (emphasizing
the importance of maintaining and strengthening “corporate democracy” in construing fiduciary
duties in corporate governance). The court also noted that:
[T]he question of “long-term” versus “short-term” values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interest without regard to a fixed investment horizon. Second, absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act in
an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the
short term, even in the context of a takeover.
Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1150.
88. Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1153 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
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formula to resolve disputes over stock valuations and the adequacy of
returns.89 For this reason, Paramount v. Time has been called a “constituency precedent.”90 Judicial diffidence in the face of complex financial
and corporate strategy issues led to the renewed empowering of the
board as the site of dispute resolution through internal governance. The
reasoning of the decision allowed the court to recast conflicts over substantive economic interests as a conflict between long-term strategic planning and short-term decisions. Reconceiving the litigation as a contest
between alternative investment and planning time horizons, the court
held that corporate boards should be granted wide latitude under the
business judgment rule in making these sorts of decisions. This deference
to the board allowed the courts to withdraw from the difficult and perhaps irresolvable issues of whose interests should be recognized (or recognized as preeminent) in these private polities.91 Yet those who thought
that Paramount v. Time heralded a legal vindication of long-term corporate planning and the interests of nonshareholder constituencies were
disappointed.92 The courts were drawn back into the morass of conflicts
among constituencies and the problem of shareholder primacy.
A mere four years after Paramount v. Time recognized the legitimacy of both nonshareholder interests and long-term corporate strategies, the Delaware Supreme Court embraced shareholder primacy in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. (Paramount v.
QVC).93 In Paramount v. QVC, the court again ruled against Paramount
Communications and held that shareholder interests in short-term maximization of equity value are primary in board decisions regarding a
takeover bid. In contrast to the deference shown the directors in Paramount v. Time, Paramount v. QVC ruled that once they had “decided to
sell control, they had an obligation to continue their search for the best
value reasonably available to the stockholders.”94 The court’s opinion
made no mention of any long-term strategic considerations or nonshareholder interests. Although the court distinguished Paramount v. Time on
factual grounds,95 the critical difference between Paramount v. QVC and

89. Id. (“The open-ended analysis mandated by Unocal is not intended to lead to a simple
mathematical exercise . . . . [P]recepts underlying the business judgment rule militate against a
court’s engaging in the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a longterm versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders.”).
90. See Orts, supra note 70, at 105 n.629.
91. See id. at 113–15 & nn.660–680.
92. Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931,
1971–88 (1991).
93. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
94. Id. at 48–49.
95. Id. at 52.
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Paramount v. Time is normative, not factual.96 The Delaware Supreme
Court once again vacillated on the norm of shareholder primacy and its
incorporation into fiduciary law, this time favoring proponents of shareholder primacy.97 Given that assertions of corporate culture and longterm strategies would dissolve the conceptual foundations, logical coherence, and practical utility of takeover and fiduciary duty law, the court
may have concluded that it needed to retreat from Paramount v. Time.
The “problem of the Paramounts” thus may be interpreted as a real-world
experiment using Berle and Dodd’s competing positions in their debate
sixty years earlier, and Berle did come out as the winner. The rightsbased structure of fiduciary law and judicial enforcement impels courts
to maintain and reinforce normative hierarchies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of shareholder primacy loomed large at the beginning
of the current era of neoliberal finance capitalism, and proved resistant to
solution largely because the mechanism of fiduciary duties frames normative conflicts in a way that doesn’t allow for resolution. This conundrum, as I have detailed it, supports Berle’s later implicit skepticism toward corporate governance and fiduciary law as vehicles for reform.
State legislatures and the Delaware courts were incapable of fashioning a
practicable alternative to the structure of fiduciary duties and shareholder
rights based on shareholder primacy, but the implications of strict enforcement of a shareholder primacy norm are as socially and politically
unacceptable as enforceable stakeholder norms are impossible under prevailing political, institutional, and legal conditions in the United States.
With the intermediate neocorporatist approach to governance through
institutional design and representation unavailable, American corporate
and economic governance remains divided between the market and the
regulatory state in the balancing of interests among multiple constituencies in a complex economy and polity.
The choice is analytically the same one that confronted Berle and
the New Dealers after the brief NIRA corporatist interlude, but the
choice in recent decades has far more often favored the market. Following the acute financial crisis of 2007–2009, the deficiencies and systemic
failures of both the market and functionally specialized regulatory agencies are excruciatingly clear. The problem for any aspiring successor to
Adolf Berle or John Kenneth Galbraith is that the politics of countervailing power that ordered both sides of the public–private divide during the
96. Cf. Gary von Strange, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes:
Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 479 (1994).
97. Cf. id. at 496 & n.193.
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postwar era are gone, while no plausible functional or institutional
equivalent has emerged.
This historically contextualized reading of Berle and Galbraith
helps to resolve a nagging paradox in the legal development of corporate
governance: even as normative underpinnings of fiduciary law provided
conceptual and doctrinal foundations for legal theories of shareholder
primacy, fiduciary duties were largely discredited as peripheral and ineffective in influencing corporate governance practices. In a political economy characterized by relations of countervailing power, Berle’s emphasis on the protection of shareholder interests within the narrow confines
of corporate governance was counterbalanced by the range of other organized private interests within the private sphere, and thus formed one
nonprivileged part of an economic order that, in its totality, ameliorated
the problem of managerial and financial power. The collapse of countervailing power was triggered first by the inflationary conditions and implosion of the New Deal political coalition during the late 1960s and
1970s, followed by the collapse of organized labor and ascendance of
neoliberal politics during the 1970s and 1980s, and finally by the emergence and entrenchment of neoliberal finance capitalism since the 1980s.
The structural conditions that reconciled the two sides of the Berlean governance paradox disintegrated and left the narrow conception of corporate governance and its inchoate valorization of shareholder interests
unmoored and dominant.
But the resolution of this paradox confronts us with another. In the
wake of the most catastrophic financial collapse since the Great Depression, the most significant reforms of financial regulation since the New
Deal have reemphasized, to a striking degree, the importance of the legal
rights of shareholders within corporate governance as a means of protecting and empowering shareholder interests. This revival of shareholder
governance rights, of which fiduciary duties are but one component, is
part of a deeper reform of the structural attributes of American corporate
governance that relies on greater representational power for shareholders
within firm governance, but remains firmly within the political economic
paradigm of contemporary finance capitalism. This potentially historic
development represents a contemporary struggle over countervailing
power, but one fought out in an era in which the contending interests
have been winnowed to those of management and finance. This political,
economic, and legal order is a long way from the one that Berle and later
Galbraith played such an influential role in creating.

